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Deborah Hensler has provided us with new understanding of contem-
porary procedural innovations. In her thoughtful essay,1 Dr. Hensler
offers an overview of both the history of mass torts and the current
methodologies of decisionmaking. She then provides a sustained critique
that these methods have not been focused on "enhanc[ing] the parties'
control over litigation outcomes or process." 2 In making her argument,
Dr. Hensler narrows the definition of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"). She rejects the common usage of the phrase as an umbrella that
expansively embraces procedures ranging from judicial settlement efforts
to court-annexed arbitration and summary jury trials? In contrast, Dr.
Hensler defines ADR to be only those procedures that, "compared to the
traditional litigation process of adversarial negotiation and trial, enhance
parties' control over litigation outcome and process."4 After a com-
prehensive review of the innovations in contemporary mass tort litigation,
Dr. Hensler concludes that a good deal of the innovation should not be
t Copyright 1995 by Judith Resnik. All rights reserved.
* Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. B.A. 1972,
Bryn Mawr College; J.D. 1975, New York University School of Law. My thanks to Denny Curtis and
Deborah Hensler for ongoing conversation about these questions, and to Kelley Poleynard, Gregory
Porter, Linda Thomas, and Steven Vaughan for wonderful research assistance.
1. Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Mass PersonalInjuryLitigation, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1587 (1995) [hereinafter Hensler, ADR
in Mass Personal Injury Litigation].
2. Id. at 1594.
3. Id. at 1590-91 (describing the growth of ADR in the 1980s).
4. Id. at 1594. This narrow definition focuses discussion, but excludes a good deal of innovation
that others have claimed properly falls within the ADR rubric. See generally Robert 1. MacCoun, E.
Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Trial and Appellate Courts, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992); Judith Resnik,
Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 211 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik, ADR and Adjudication].
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classified as "ADR," and that, in general, procedures in mass torts have
not succeeded in "bring[ing] plaintiffs into the dialogue on mass personal
injury litigation.-'
I share many of Dr. Hensler's concerns. Thus, my commentary will
not focus on areas of disagreement but on the broader lessons to be drawn
from her discussion of ADR in mass torts. Below, I consider the changing
roles of judges, the interaction between roles taken in large-scale cases and
so-called "ordinary" litigation, and the effects of methods of paying plain-
tiffs' attorneys in large-scale cases on, in Hensler's words, "bring[ing]
plaintiffs into the dialogue on mass personal injury litigation."6
First, as other papers in this Symposium illustrate, many
commentators use the language of game theory to consider the incentives
of the "players" in mass torts.7 Francis McGovern has correctly identified
judges as key players and described the strategic role that members of the
judiciary take.8 It is critical to emphasize that, although judges are
"players," judges are not ordinary players, to be equated with defendants,
their lawyers, insurance companies, their lawyers, plaintiffs, or their
lawyers. Judges "come to the table" with the force of society. Because
judges embody legitimacy before they act, they have different "chips."
Judges thus have a central role to play in legitimating-or
delegitimating-certain forms of decisionmaking.9  While idiosyncratic
5. Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, supra note 1, at 1626.
6. Id.
7. E.g., Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821
(1995). This form of analysis has become common in the procedural literature. See, e.g., Janet C.
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV.
497, 528-57 (1991) (analyzingthe incentives of litigants in securities class actions); JonathanR. Macey,
Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 1. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994)
(considering the role of judges' preferences in fashioning procedural rules).
8. McGovern, supra note 7, at 1839.
9. Illustrating this point is the controversy over the propriety of judicial acquiescence to litigant
demands that, as part of a settlement, judges vacate decisions ofjudges or juries that are not challenged
as legally or factually defective. Compare Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 121, 123
(Cal. 1992) (explaining that "parties are the persons (or entities) most affected by a judgment, which
is the ultimate product of their sustained effort and expense," and holding that, "absent a showing of
extraordinary circumstances," parties should be permitted to vacate lower court judgments as a part of
a settlement) with In re Memorial Hosp., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that judgments are "public act[s] of government" rather than "the parties' property," and that courts
should not vacate precedents because parties have requested such action as a condition of settlement).
In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994), the Supreme Court
was asked by a party, after settlement had been reached and after the Court had granted certiorari, to
vacate a lower court decision as moot. The Court declined to do so because "mootness by reason of
settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review," but the Court left open the possibility
that "exceptional circumstances" could justify such action. Id. at 393. See generally Judith Resnik,
Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role ofAdjudication at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994) (analyzing the import of the debate
about "vacatur on consent").
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behaviors of particular lawyers or parties may be dismissed as the actions
of possible outliers in the story, not so the acts of judges. If judges agree
to the calculation of compensation by using a grid system, 0 to "auction"
claims,' or to group cases in which judges try representative claims,
thereafter extrapolating damage verdicts to other cases,12 judges legitimate
those procedures. Moreover, as we have seen over time, while appellate
courts may reject a given "innovation" by a trial judge, appellate courts
can be convinced, when trial judges engage in related and similar
procedures over a period of time, of the need for and legitimacy of
innovations. 3
10. See, for example, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ. A. CV94-P-
11558-S, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 1, 1994), in which the court approved a $4.2 billion class
settlement containing a Schedule of Benefits for class members suffering conditions specified in an
accompanying Disease Schedule. Additionally, the settlement provided for two opt-out rights for
plaintiffs: an initial right and a "second opt-out right" that could be exercised if the $1.2 billion Current
Disease CompensationProgram portion of the settlementwas depleted. Id. at *7. Further, the decision
pirmits defendants to exercise an option to withdraw from the settlement, making the final denouement
of the case unclear as of this writing. See id. at *6 (noting that, when 5% of the putative class
members initially opted out, those 14,300 persons comprised a "substantial" number, raising "the
specter that one or more defendants may elect to withdraw from the settlement"). As of May 1995,
the filing of bankruptcy by one of the defendants, Dow Corning, raised questions about the longevity
of the settlement. See Milo Geyelin &Timothy D. Schellhardt, Dow Corning Seeks Chapter 11 Shield,
Clouding Status of Breast-Implant Pact, WALL ST. I., May 16, 1995, at A3, A6. The trial court's
decision in April of 1995 to include Dow Chemical as a defendant may also affect the settlement. In
re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1995 WL 309465 (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 25, 1995).
11. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (requiring that "the
selection of class counsel and determination of counsel's compensation be made by competitive
bidding"); see also IonathanR. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role In Class
Action andDerivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and RecommendationsforReform, 58 U. C I. L.
REV. 1, 105 (1991) (suggesting "an auction approach to large-scale, small-claim class and derivative
suits").
12. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymarkl Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 666-67 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (permitting
findings with respect to "sample members" of a class to be applied to other class members), appeal
filed, No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. May 3, 1993); see also Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights,
Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993) (analyzing concerns
about, and benefits of, sampling, and advocating a case-by-case approach); Michael J. Saks & Peter
D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits ofAggregation and Sampling in the Trial of
Mass Torts, 44 STAN L. REV. 815, 851 (1992) (arguing that aggregation and sampling may "achieve
a level of justice that simply is not possible in traditional individual trials").
13. Initial efforts to treat the Dalkon Shield litigation as a class action were met with disapproval
by the appellate court. See, e.g., Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (vacating the certification of a statewide liability
class because of a lack of "typicality" and an inadequate showing that the class action was superior to
other modes of adjudication, and vacating a national punitive damages class because of a failure to
prove the existence of a limited fund and to meet the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation requirements), cet. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). For a discussion by the trial judge
whose order was vacated, see Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone, 98
F.R.D. 323, 325 (1983) (arguing that "for a small, but inevitable number of cases involving hundreds
or thousands of persons injured in similar ways by a single nationally marketed product, or in some
types of mass catastrophe, the class action device holds the most promise as an effective tool to
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We would do well to pause and pay attention to the language, and
specifically to the increasingly comfortable use of the game theory
metaphor. The image of the judge coming to the table is itself noteworthy.
This is no longer the "imperial" or the "umpireal" 14 judge on the bench,
but a judge now down in the trenches,15 as a participant in the nego-
tiation, as a "dealmaker."16 Hensler's paper implies what I want to make
explicit: the judiciary (joined by a group of increasingly powerful mass tort
lawyers 7) plays a key role in delineating the parameters of acceptable
procedures, of what should be called ADR, of what kinds of resolutions are
acceptable, of what kinds of negotiations the courts should sanction, enter
into, or decline.
Judges and lawyers should be self-conscious about the implications of
their strategies and decisions. When judges decide to come to the nego-
tiation, to embrace the roles of player and dealmaker rather than umpire,
judges are not simply acquiescing in the evolution of the judicial role. As
one considers the changes in the judicial role over the past half century,
one can map a major transformation in the debate about judging. Judges
have moved from adjudicators and umpires to managers and now players,
urging settlement and resolution, and crafting new alternative procedures
and formulas to distribute large amounts of money to many individuals and
classes. No longer should a debate about judging be framed as about the
accommodate competing interests"). Seven years later, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a class certification
of Dalkon Shield claimants who had sued the insurance company for the manufacturer of the shield.
The settlement of that action, which was also approved, was conditioned on certification of the class.
In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir.) (noting that "the 'trend' is once again to give
Rule 23 a liberal rather than a restrictive construction"), cert. denied 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
Similarly, appellate courts rejected early efforts by trial judges in the asbestos litigation to use
issue preclusion, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 343-47 (5th Cir. 1982)
(discussing the conflicting trial court decisions on the issues and the unfairness to defendants who
lacked notice of the magnitudeof subsequent claims at the time of the first suit), and to rely on judicial
notice, e.g., id. at 347-48 ("The proposition that asbestos causes cancer.., is not at present so self-
evident a proposition as to be subject to judicial notice."). In 1991, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation-after rejecting consolidation on five occasions since 1977-revised its earlier decisions and
consolidated virtually all of the then pending 26,000 federal asbestos cases for pretrial proceedings
before a single district judge. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415-17
(J.P.M.L. 1991); see also Cmnino, 751 F. Supp. at 666-67 (using aggregated methods for trying
asbestos cases are necessary and explaining the legality of such methods).
14. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975).
15. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 386-414 (1982).
16. Donald Payant, Remarks at the National Conference on Mass Torts (Nov. 10, 1994) (tapes
on file with the Texas Law Review).
17. See Deborah R. Hensler& Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass PersonalInjuryLitigation:
A Socio-LegalAnalysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 964, 1025-26 (1993) (discussing the role of plaintiffs
in mass tort litigation in the 1980s). The availability of lawyers and financing of litigation affect legal
rules and rights-seeking in an array of areas. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation:
Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking, 18 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 423 (1993) (examining the role
of corporate lawyers as legal entrepreneurs, developing concepts that become a part of law).
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"active" as compared to the "passive" judge, but rather as about the
propriety and utility of the deployment of judges as adjudicators, as
compared to their use as negotiators and dealmakers, and about the effects
of simultaneously assuming a multitude of roles at once."8
Many commentators currently celebrate this reframing of the judicial
role and explain it as essentialtg-particularly in cases that form the
subject matter of this Symposium, mass torts2 That brings me to my
second point: Whatever judges and lawyers do in mass torts is unlikely to
be confined to mass torts. How the "mass tort litigation game" is refrained
will also shape other forms of litigation. No one should think that they
have the power to confine the reforms. If changes are understood as
effective (however measured) in the context of mass torts, reforms are
likely to be adopted in very different contexts.
A quick review of the past five decades illustrates how procedures
crafted for the "big case" have migrated to the "small case." In the 1940s,
federal judges became concerned that antitrust cases were "protracted"-
and had to be handled in a manner different from other cases.2" The
proposed judicial response was to take "control." ' In the 1960s and
1970s, civil rights and securities cases formed the centerpieces of group
litigation. Once again, judicial control emerged as a central tenet. New
procedures (remember the "fluid class"') and remedial mechanisms (such
as structural injunctions, busing, and special masters) came to the fore.'
18. For a discussion of the structural changes that prompted this evolution in the judicial role, see
WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIzING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 125-58 (1990); Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 15, at 391-402.
19. E.g., Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR' Techniques in the Reformation Model of
Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905, 1913 (1993); Robert F. Peckhaam, A Judicial
Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 255-60 (1985)
20. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 539
(1994) [hereinafter Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas]; Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The
Effect ofEquity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 269, 281-302.
21. In 1949, Chief Justice Vinson appointed the Committee to Study Procedure in Antitrust and
Other Protracted Cases, which reported, in 1953, that reforms were needed because the protracted case
"might threaten thejudicial process itself." See Committee to Study Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other
Protracted Cases, Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, reprinted in 13 F.R.D. 62, 64
(1953).
22. Id.; see also Resolutions Adopted at the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 614, 614-15
(1958) ("The judge assigned should at the earliest moment take actual control of the case and
rigorously exercise such control throughout the proceedings in such case." (emphasis in original)).
23. See Eisdn v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974).
24. See Curtis J. Berger, Away From the Court House and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special
Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978) (discussing his role as a special master attempting to negotiate
an agreed-upon remedy in a case involving segregated schools and housing); Abram Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284, 1289-1304 (1976) (arguing that
a bipolar model of adjudication did not reflect proceedings in public law cases, in which the issuance
of a decree was but a step in the litigation and courts relied on a range of individuals to design and then
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In the 1980s and 1990s, mass torts have become the source of parallel
innovation and debate, about the shape of the litigation, its scope, and the
remedial options.' In each iteration, judges have been at the forefront
of naming the problems and of offering responses. However, while many
of those responses are designed for the large-scale case, innovations in
large cases affect what happens in small, so-called "ordinary" cases.
Let me give an example. The possibility of a pretrial conference has
been a fixture of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since 1938, when
Rule 16 was drafted.' Initially, judicial use of pretrials for management
of cases was erratic and occasional. But, as mentioned above, in what
were then called "protracted cases" (primarily anti-trust litigation), federal
judges urged their colleagues to take charge and to use the pretrial con-
ference as the point at which to assert authority over the litigation and the
parties.'
Judges did, liked the results, and began to use pretrial conferences and
management in an array of cases. Stephen Yeazell has recently chronicled
the development of the expanded authority of district judges that re-
sulted.' The end result is familiar: in 1983, Rule 16 was revised to
require mandatory pretrial scheduling in most cases.29 In 1990, by
enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act,'o Congress endorsed judicial
monitor "complex forms of ongoing relief"); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary
and Extraordinary in InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARv. L. REV. 465, 465-67 (1980) (discussing judicial
involvement in multi-party remedies in cases predating the public law litigation of the 1960s and
1970s); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1979) (describing the remedial activities in structural litigation).
25. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 902-08 (1984) (arguing that, given the resources
of defendants in mass tort cases, individual litigation, financed by contingent fee contracts, is
insufficient and that aggregate procedures, such as class actions, are necessary in mass torts); Roger
H. Trangsrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass TortLitigation, 70 CoRNELLL. REv. 779 (1985) (objecting
to some aspects of the trend to aggregate mass torts and arguing for the vitality, as modified, of more
individualized processing); Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 20, at 476-81 (surveying the
administrative and procedural concerns raised by mass tort litigation).
26. Rule 16 originally provided:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before it for a conference to consider ... [the simplification of the issues; ....
[amending] the pleadings;... obtaining admissions of fact[;] . . . limitling] ... expert
witnesses; ... [the advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for
findings... ; [s]uch other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 308 U.S. 684 (1938).
27. See, e.g., Resolutions Adopted at the Seminar on Protracted Cases, supra note 22, at 614-15.
28. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS.
L. REV. 631, 646-66.
29. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 207 (1983). District
courts were given authority to exempt by local rule designated categories of cases; specifically
mentioned as possibilities were social security claims and prisoners' cases. Id.
30. Pub. L. No. 101-605, tit. 1, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-
482 (Supp. V 1993)).
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management of the pretrial phase. In 1993, federal rulemakers again
amended Rule 16 to elaborate what could transpire within the pretrial
phase.31
In this description lie both general truths about procedural rulemaking
and a specific warning. The promulgation of formal, authorizing rules
often follows practices that have already been in place for some time.
Moreover, the migration of procedures works in a variety of directions.
Why do many commentators and participants perceive it acceptable in mass
torts to provide, as a remedy, a grid, on which to map injuries and by
which to allocate funds?32 Grids are a familiar mechanism because
administrative law judges work from such schedules-created either by
statute or implementing regulations-in cases ranging from workers'
compensation to disability benefits. Thus, some of the "innovation" in
mass torts is replication and importation, from agencies to courts, of the
procedures found in administrative adjudication schemes.33
Further, the willingness to pull together a series of tort cases-whether
as a class action, a consolidated proceeding, or a multi-district litigation-is
itself a part of a societal movement away from individual adjudication.
Mass torts are but one example of a general trend within the federal courts
31. The 1993 amendments further detail the judicial role in managing the pretrial process,
controlling discovery, structuring trials, and helping parties to settle cases. Judges were also authorized
to require parties or their representatives to attend pretrial conferences or be available by phone "to
considerpossiblesettlement ofthedispute." Amendmentsto the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146
F.R.D. 401, 427-31 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Amendments].
Moreover, the 1993 amendments revised the description of ADR. In 1983, Rule 16 referred to
ADR by the term "extrajudicial procedures." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1983). After the 1993
amendments, Rule 16 referred to ADR as "special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when
authorized by statute or local rule." 1993 Amendments, supra, at 429. The 1993 amendments
acknowledge that ADR had moved inside the courts. The Advisory Committee explained that the
revision "describe[s] more accurately" procedures aside from "traditional settlement conferences" that
"may be helpful in settling litigation." Id. at 600.
32. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rolph, Framing the Compensation Inquiry, 13 CAMMOzo L. REV. 2011
(1992) (discussing the issues and criteria that all compensation systems must address, including
"eligibility screens" and rules for processing claims and awarding sums of money). Several litigations
have relied on grids, including the Dalkon Shield case and the breast implant proposed settlement. See
In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ. A. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 WL 578353,
at *24 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (describing the Schedule of Benefits); Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust,
Dalkon Shield Packet (1990) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (describing four claim options and
disease schedule); Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (Or
Found?), 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 617, 641,628-51 (1992) (describing the "highly structured, rules-based
process" used to evaluate Dalkon Shield claims). One commentator has advocated the legislative
establishment of an administrative compensation scheme to allocate funds to claimants alleging injuries
from asbestos. Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Needfor an Administrative
Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1821-28 (1992).
33. Whether such borrowing will be successful remains a topic of debate. See, e.g., Robert L.
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD.
L. REV. 951, 964-82 (1993) (detailing criteria for workable administrative compensation schemes and
explaining the misfit between certain forms of toxic torts and administrative compensation).
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of life-tenured judges doing less adjudication in individual, relatively small
value cases. Such cases are either decided en masse, by Article H judges
superintending large-scale litigations, or are delegated-to magistrate and
bankruptcy judges within the federal courts, to claims facilities created by
the federal courts, or to administrative agencies outside the federal
courts.' As such rules are crafted and procedures are invented for the
large-scale cases, one should be wary of justifying some extraordinary
departure from what might otherwise be required on the grounds that it is
an idiosyncratic event (i.e., "just this one time, because this is Agent
Orange," or "this is asbestos"). What judges and lawyers perceive to be
useful in one arena will not remain a procedure only for the
"extraordinary.""
My third comment is about other effects of large-scale litigation on the
adjudicatory process. The movement over the past decades has continually
been in the direction of defining a "case" as a larger and larger unit of
decisionmaking. I recently had the occasion to go back and reread some
cases from the 1950s about joinder; I was surprised to read judicial debate
34. See Judith Resnik, Finding the Fact Finders: Shifting Values and Modes of Decisionmaking,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming). For examples of proposals to further delegate cases away from
Article IH judges, see FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 55 (1990) (proposing that Social
Security claims be heard before an administrative law judge, whose decision would be appealable to
"a new Article I Court of Disability Claims, with review in the courts of appeal limited to constitutional
claims and to pure issues of law"); id. at 58-59 (detailing a proposal by the dissenters from the Report
that would retain district court review, but interpose review by a new Social Security Benefits Review
Board "to provide thorough administrative review of decision by AIJs" and modeled on entities created
to review black lung cases); COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 126 (Mar. 1995)
("[Flederal court jurisdiction could be curtailed in cases appropriately resolved in Article I tribunals,
administrative agencies, or state courts. Examples... include social security benefit claims, contract
claims, benefit claims under ERISA welfare plans, forfeiture proceedings, and cases primarily involving
state law issues. .. ").
35. This migration of procedure from one arena to another is evidence of a preference for trans-
substantive procedures. Recall the insight of the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
that one set of trans-substantive rules could govern different kinds of cases. See generally Robert M.
Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE LJ. 718 (1975).
The trans-substantive regime has deteriorated to some extent, as exemplified by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2254-2255 (1988) (setting forth different procedures for post-conviction remedies for state and
federal prisoners); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) (1986) (providing guidelines for use
in large-scale cases); Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479, 488-97
(1989) (setting forth procedures for use in multidistrict litigation). Many commentators propose further
proceduralvariations. See Parker&Hagin, supra note 19, at 1914 (proposing the assignment of cases
to litigation tracks based on the matter's complexity, the need for discovery, the parties' financial
resources, the public policy concerns, and the novelty of the issues involved).
At the same time, one sees evidence of the pull towards trans-substantive procedure. If it is
useful and feasible to put together all the claimants from an air crash, hotel fire, or securities fraud,
why not put together all claimants in a mass products liability lawsuit? How about claimants in a toxic
tort? Ifjudicial management is good in a large, complex, or protracted case, why not also manage the
small?
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about whether one could join several plaintiffs, who had been injured in the
same car accident, into a single lawsuit or whether each individual plaintiff
had his or her "own" case.36 For much of our procedural history, courts
worried about the melding of claims and the need for particularity about
individual claimants. 37 That theme is reiterated on occasion but has
diminished over time, so that it is only the occasional "dissenter" who
argues for individual case treatment.38
Once working on the scale-to wit, the very large, very high stakes
cases involving millions if not billions of dollars and hundreds if not
thousands of individuals 9-that many of the participants in this Sym-
posium have helped to craft, experienced judges and lawyers may have a
difficult time believing that they should be spending a good deal of time on
smaller cases, and particularly on the comparatively small-stakes,
individual plaintiff-defendant dispute. Having just negotiated a $300
million dollar settlement for 10,000 people, how does one then turn to the
$80,000 dispute and spend three days trying the case?
But also note that the $300 million resolution is often a settlement, not
a trial. Once working at the very large scale, it appears both awesome and
unfeasible to try the amalgam created. Size itself makes problematic the
activity of adjudication, with its requisite bases of information obtained
through evidentiary screens, its aspirations towards specific knowledge of
facts, and its attention to detail. Although the disputants may have the
resources for trials, that mode of decisionmaking seems too cumbersome,
sprawling, and inadequate to the task. In the large-scale litigation,
something called ADR (not necessarily what Dr. Hensler would call ADR,
but something other than adjudication) seems to make sense to lawyers and
36. See, e.g., State ex tel. Rosenv. McLaughlin, 318 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Mo. 1958) (holding that
a trial judge could order consolidation for trial of four actions involving the same car accident and four
plaintiffs in the same family).
37. In Rosen, the trial court consolidated four separate actions for pretrial purposes but ordered
four separate trials, stating that "it would be an undue burden on a trial court to hear all four of the
• * . cases at one trial and that the verdict forms, instructions to the jury and other matters would be
confusing and burdensome to a jury and a trial judge." Id. at 183 (omission in original) (quoting the
trial court's order); see also Hardy v. Johns-ManvilleSales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 343,344-45 (5th Cir.
1982) (reversing the trial court's application of offensive collateral estoppel to asbestos defendants on
the ground that the earlier judgment was "ultimately ambiguous as to certain key issues," and pointing
out distinctions among various asbestos plaintiffs and defendants).
38. See, e.g., Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REv. 69 (criticizing some aggregated proceedings but supporting group discovery).
39. See, e.g., RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY 11, 23 (1991) (noting that the Dalkon Shield litigation involved 3.6 million Dalkon
Shields that "had been implanted in women all over the world," and that, by 1984, A.H. Robins had
paid out $260 million to settle 7,700 claims); PETER H. ScHuCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS
TOXIc DISASrERS IN THE COURTS 45, 164 (1986) (stating that Agent Orange litigation "eventually
included 2.4 million Vietnam veterans, as well as their spouses and afflicted children, born and
unborn," and settled for $180 million).
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judges.4° In the smaller cases, ADR also appears to makes sense, but for
a different reason-that the case is too "small" to merit the investment of
resources that a trial would demand.
Fourth, as I watch the proliferation of possible procedures for
decisionmaking (all the alternatives sitting under the ADR umbrella and not
only those that Hensler's approach would admit), I see declining enthu-
siasm for one kind of decisionmaking under the canopy-adjudication itself.
I am less sanguine than some about the possibilities of a "multi-door"
courtroom, in which equal access exists for all doors. I doubt that, when
there are half a dozen decisionmaking forms and a host of different kinds
of procedures-ranging from mediation to court-annexed arbitration-that
the door marked adjudication will remain wide open.4 I believe that we
are seeing a shift in the forms of procedure, from an adjudicatory model
towards a resolution model. During the last few decades ADR has become
an integral part of the state's mechanisms for responding to disputes.42
From one perspective, the two modes are no longer discrete conversants
but have begun to be integrated into or meld into each other.' From
another vantage point, the state's system is increasingly itself in disarray,
and the "private" system is becoming the one of choice, when litigants
have the resources and ability to "opt out." 44
40. Other factors affect the impulse toward ADR. See Resnik, ADR andAdjudication, supra note
4, at 241-52 (analyzing how ADR is perceived in relationship to adjudication and how proponents of
ADR argue that its strengths include that it is less expensive, quicker, friendlier, more efficient, and
fairer than adjudication). Further, the current criminal caseload within federal courts, mandated by
speedy trial legislation that gives docket preferences to criminal cases, also provides reasons for
reformatting civil decisionmaking. Mandatory penalties create incentives for criminal defendants not
to plea bargain and sentencing guidelines demand fact finding at that stage of the proceedings.
41. In his influential essay, Professor Frank Sander proposed a model of dispute resolution that
was "not simply a court house but a Dispute Resolution Center." Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of
Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 131 (1976). Others have credited Sander with proposing the
"multi-doored courthouse." E.g. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS
ACT OF 1990, S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 n.15 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6803, 6831 n.15; Jethro K. Lieberman& James F. Henry, Lessons From theAlternative
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424, 426 n.17 (1986); Robert B. McKay, Rule 16
and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAMrE L. REv. 818, 824 (1988); Charles Thensted,
Litigation and Less: The Negotiation Alternative, 59 TUL. L. REV. 76, 93 & n.77 (1984).
42. See, e.g., Court Arbitration Authorization Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 1102 Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and JudicialAdministration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1102] (statement of Judge Ann Claire
Williams, of the Northern District of Illinois, representing the Judicial Conference of the United States)
(reporting that "[j]udicial use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) programs was firmly grounded
in the Federal Courts" even prior to the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act in 1990).
43. Resnik, ADR and Adjudication, supra note 4, at 215 n.13.
44. See Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework for
Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12B STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y, 367, 374 (1992) ("[S]ome of
the reforms within public courts that have been described as privatization can be seen as part of the
competitionfor an attractive disputing process." (emphasis in original)); Lauren K. Robel, Private
Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. LJ. 891, 892 (1993) ("The courts face a burgeoning industry
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The preference for settlement over trial, for abbreviated procedures
over expansive procedures, is pushing procedural reforms toward non-
adjudicatory resolutions. Evidence of such preferences can be found in a
variety of proposals. Judge William Schwarzer has suggested revision of
the federal offer-of-judgment rule.' Judge Robert Parker has proposed
case tracking plans, under which relatively few cases would qualify for
jury adjudication.' If current trends continue, an individual's "right" to
adjudication, to a decision by a person who bears the title "judge" in a
court, will be permitted only upon special justification.
Enthusiasm for ADR, in its many different forms, is one of several
factors making it difficult to preserve a vibrant role for adjudication.'
Opening those other doors labeled "ADR" has required energy and a belief
that such innovation is both useful and good. As Hensler's paper
documents, proponents of ADR have a myriad of views that support a
diversity of programs." For some, ADR is a default position, second
best but necessary because adjudication has not made good on its promises.
The queue for adjudication is too long, the costs too high.49 For others,
ADR is not second best, it is better than adjudication-for a variety of
reasons. 50 For some proponents, ADR is more flexible, more
imaginative, and more engaging of parties than is adjudication.51 For
other advocates, certain forms of ADR are more generative of information
in alternative dispute resolution... that threatens to siphon off many civil cases, including those of
litigants wealthy enough to afford it.").
45. See William W Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to Reducing the
Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992).
46. See Parker & Hagin, supra note 19, at 1915-17.
47. See HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 18, at 99-123 (exploring technocratic responses
altering adjudicatory modes); Garth, supra note 44, at 370-76 (describing the effects of competition
from private dispute resolution practices on adjudication); Resnik, ADR and Adjudication, supra note
4, at 244-46 (discussing how that efforts to promote ADR have been focused on comparing it favorably
to adjudication and intersect with other factors affecting an appreciation for rights-seeking); Yeazell,
supra note 28, at 632-39 (analyzing how that the 1938 Federal Rules' creation of a pretrial process
altered the processes of litigation and contributed to a decline in the rate of cases going to trial).
48. Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, supra note 1, at 1589-91.
49. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half
Empty, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1647 (1995) (discussing the volume of mass torts and arguing that alternative
procedures are necessary "because of absolute government paralysis in dealing with mass torts"); see
also Panel Discussion, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1199, 1207 (1993) (emphasizing courts' lack of resources
to try mass tort claims one at a time).
50. See, e.g., Recent Developments in Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolutions (ADR), 100
F.R.D. 512, 514 (1983) (comments of Eric D. Green at theJudicial Conference of the Federal Circuit)
("[E]ven if court calendars were reduced to more manageable levels, the alternatives described [i.e.,
private mini-trials] . . . permit the parties to arrive at better solutions than a court can impose.").
51. See, e.g., Eric D. Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, LITIGATION, Fall 1982, at 12, 17 (arguing
that parties "should at least consider a mini-trial in every case"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing
Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR, " 19 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1991) (commenting that ADR may "be better because [it] ... provide[s] a greater
opportunity for party participation and recognition of party goals").
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than is adjudication, and, as a consequence, the results are better. 52
Others like ADR because of its frequent reliance on parties' consent,
which, rather than a court order, forms the basis of the resolution. The
assumption is that parties' tailor-made agreements and remedies are
preferable to court-imposed outcomes. 3
The commentary that accompanies ADR is filled with expressions that
the adjudicatory model has not served many well: that its costs, its
complexity, indeed its individualization, fail to respond to problems that
are now seen as shared rather than individual. Moreover, judges-whom
one might have expected to be the prime defenders of adjudication and to
praise the system in which they work and with which they are so closely
identified-are often in the vanguard of the development of alternatives to
adjudication.'M
Procedural changes within courts are, of course, not driven exclusively
by internal phenomena. As the bench, bar, and Congress call for ADR,
other developments affect the context in which adjudication is perceived.
Over this past two decades, we have seen increased disenchantment with
government regulation; many commentators read the 1994 election results
and the legislation proposed in its wake as reflective of an anti-regulatory
mood.5 In this larger context, the process of adjudication, which
52. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Hearings on H.R. 2497 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 66, 66 (1990) (statement of Marshall I. Breger, Chairman of the Administrative Conference
of the U.S.) (praising ADR as faster, cheaper, better, and more imaginative and creative than
adjudication).
53. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. Rnv. 2169, 2239 (1993) (advocating
private ADR rather than court-annexed programs, in part because parties in private proceedings can
select their arbitrator and the rules to be used); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin? 1993 J. Disp. RESOL.
1, 3 (1991) (arguing that compelled ADR undermines its usefulness). Cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note
51, at 25, 42 (1991) (noting the problem of coercion associated with mandatory ADR, but advocating
mandatory, nonbinding ADR methods).
54. Judges, such as the Raymond Broderick (E.D. Pa.), Thomas Lambros (N.D. Ohio), Arthur
Spiegel (S.D. Ohio), and Richard Enslen (W.D. Mich.), are particularly enthusiastic about processes
such as summary jury trials and court-annexed arbitration, both of which rely on the introduction of
non-judge third parties who respond to the development of factual or legal information. See Raymond
I. Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE217, 218-20 (1989);
Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77 JUDICATURE 6
(1993); S. Arthur Spiegel, Swnmary Jury Trials, 54 U. CINN. L. REV. 829 (1986); Richard A. Enslen,
ADR: Another Acronym, or a Viable Alternative to the High Cost of Litigation and Crowded Court
Dockets? The Debate Commences, 18 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1988).
55. See, e.g., Frank Swoboda, Plan Combines a Revival of Reaganomics, Reins on Regulation,
WASH. PoS, Dec. 14, 1994, at A23 (examining proposals in the Republican Contract with America
to diminish government regulation). See also the proposed Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R.
450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (imposing a moratorium on regulatory activity and finding that
cost/benefit analysis is required to improve government efficiency).
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involves the application of law to fact, is recognized as having a regulatory
potential that is less appealing than are the possibilities of forming
consensual agreements among private parties. Privatization and ADR in
the courts are, I believe, related phenomena.56 Of course, to the extent
that preferences between ADR and adjudication are shaped by strategic
interests, enthusiasm for one or the other may depend on whether one
perceives courts to be hospitable or hostile to claims that expand rights.
For example, at the Conference on Mass Torts, concern was expressed that
a settlement orientation (in cases such as Agent Orange and in the pending
litigation on breast implants) has worked to relax standards of causation
and proof of injury.' Some of those who had been corporate supporters
of ADR may now support a return to the rule of law, because settlement-
oriented ADR facilitates a blurriness about rights that a legal regime might
not recognize to exist.
In short, the current embrace of alternative dispute resolution entails
serious dissatisfaction with, if not dislike of, adjudication." While some
forms of ADR, such as those within Dr. Hensler's definition, may be less
The shift in attitude can also be seen in Supreme Court rulings on "private arbitration" of federal
statutory claims. In the 1950s, the Court declined to require arbitration and insisted on the regulatory
role of courts. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 435, 438 (1953) (holding that an arbitration clause
violated the Securities Act of 1933 because it involved a surrender of an unwaiveable right and was thus
void), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
In contrast, in the 1980s, the Supreme Court has revised its doctrine, now reading Congress as
approving private arbitration and downplaying the import of the regulatory role of courts. See, e.g.,
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (stating that arbitration and
adjudication were equally able to resolve the important public interest of resolving disputes). Both
arbitration and adjudication are reconceived over these decades, and the convergence of features
emphasizesthe ability ofboth to resolve disputes morethanthe regulationofbehavior. Seealso Susan
Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique
to the Reconstruction of the Juridicial Subject, 66 DENV. U. L. REv. 437, 472-84 (1989) (discussing
the ADR movement's emphasis on disputes as conflicts of discrete interests, as contrasted with
adjudication's goals of preserving and enforcing rights).
56. See Garth, supra note 44, at 372-76 (discussing the relationship between private and public
adjudication services); Robel, supra note 44, at 892-93 (observing that supporters of privatization of
government activities articulate similar arguments to those used by ADR supporters).
57. E.g., ZoF Baird, Remarks at the National Mass Tort Conference (Nov. 10, 1994) (tapes on
file with the Texas Law Review).
58. I should add that I am not a romantic about the "good old days of adjudication." Deborah
Hensler, among others, has provided a good deal of data on the "myths" of the one-on-onetort system
and its failures to provide access to many potential claimants. See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass
Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89 [hereinafter Hensler, Myths and Realities].
However, I am also not a romantic about the current set of alternatives, which, as Dr. Hensler
demonstrates, also have serious limitations. Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, supra
note 1; see also Alexander, supra note 7, at 524-67 (conducting an empirical study of a small sample
of securities cases in which the cases settled at similar values, suggesting a lack of relationship between
the merits of a case and its settlement value); Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution
Procedures and Outcomes: MeasurementProblems and Possibilities, 66 DExv. U. L. REv. 419, 424-32
(1989) (discussing varying levels of success of ADR programs).
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in tension with adjudication than others, the settlement-oriented regime
linked to many ADR modes is in tension with an adjudicatory model predi-
cated on fact finding and imposition of legal rules.59 My point here is not
to argue for or against the changes but to argue for self-consciousness
about contributions to change.
My fifth and final point relates to Dr. Hensler's call for more partic-
ipation and control by the plaintiffs, as distinct from their attorneys.'
My question for her is about the relationship between involvement of
lawyers and the involvement of litigants. Does Dr. Hensler envision a
world of direct engagement-of litigant without lawyer? Or, does she
propose participation by litigants with or through individual lawyers?
Mass torts provide an interesting arena in which to think about these
questions. In some kinds of class actions, such as securities cases, small
groups of lawyers represent a host of individuals who, absent the existence
of a class action, would have no counsel and no case at all. Further,
securities litigants may not even know that they have suffered any injuries.
In contrast, in many mass torts, each plaintiff has knowledge of injury and
comes into the aggregate with his or her own contingency fee lawyer.61
Not all lawyers are competent, nor do all pay attention to their clients.
But if a lawyer is functioning as he or she should, that lawyer provides a
bundle of services to a client. The lawyer for a personal injury client is
not only engaged in obtaining an outcome-a sum of money. Rather, in
quantitative research, tort litigants describe their interest in "telling their
side of the story,"62 in wanting more than outcomes. Litigants have
reported seeking vindication, knowledge, and acceptance of
59. My purpose here is not to provide a fulsome exposition of the goals, values, and purposes of
ADR and adjudication, as well as an understanding of the overlaps and tension among them. Others
have done so. Marc Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, 12B STUD. L. POL.
& Soc'y 393, 395-407 (1992); Silbey & Sarat, supra note 55, at 472-96. See generally STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, & NANCY H. ROGERS, DisPuTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PRoCESSES (2d ed. 1992). In addition, one might, as Deborah Hensler does,
attempt to rope off some procedures as not ADR but as creative judicial management or simply
settlement efforts, and preserve an arena for ADR that is closer to adjudicatory models.
60. Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, supra note 1, at 1622.
61. See generally Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Representation and Fees (manuscript for the Research Conference on Class Actions and
Related Issues in Complex Litigation) 138-55 (Apr. 8, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with
Texas Law Review) [hereinafter Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate]
(exploring the respective roles of individually retained plaintiffs' attorneys ("IRPA"), as compared to
lawyers appointed to plaintiff steering committees ("PSC") or as lead counsel, and analyzing how court-
structured aggregate litigation can affect roles played by both litigants and lawyers).
62. See Hensler, Myths & Realities, supra note 58, at 99; E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun,
Patricia A. Ebener, William L.F. Felstiner, Deborah R. Hensler, Judith Resnik, & Tom R. Tyler, In
the Eye of the Beholder. Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System,
24 LAw & SoC'Y REv. 953 (1990).
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responsibility.' When lawyers for such clients are doing a good job,
those lawyers are in communication with their clients, whose needs include
education about the value of a claim and any proposed remedy,64
assistance in seeking expert evaluation of claims, and information about the
legal process. Some of what these lawyers do for their clients is
characterized-often negatively-as "handholding." In the context of most
mass torts, the need for consolation may be great, and both the lawyers and
the legal system may not be able respondents.'
In a large-scale mass tort, the act of consolidating the individual cases
into a jumbo lawsuit risks breaking individual attorney-client relationships.
In general, because the litigation is primarily controlled from the plaintiffs'
side by a plaintiffs' steering committee (PSC) or other lead counsel,
individually-retained plaintiffs' attorneys (IRPAs) have greatly diminished
roles.' The questions are about the desirability and utility, from a
societal or individual point of view, of the relationship between litigant and
court, and between client and lawyer, as distinct from the transfer of
money in payment for injuries.67
63. See, e.g., SANDRA M. GILBERT, WRONGFUL DEATH: A MEDICAL TRAGEDY 104-57 (1995)
(providing Gilbert's personal narrative of experiences when her husband died unexpectedly in an
operation and she received little information about the cause, and describing the limited responses of
her lawyer and the legal system); GERALD M. STERN, THE BuFFALo CREEK DISASTER at x (1976)
(stating that survivors of the Buffalo Creek disaster sued, in part, to "make the company admit its
responsibility... and to make sure something like this would never happen again"); SCHUCK, supra
note 39, at 174-76 (relating the testimony of Vietnam veterans seeking recognition of their harms and
admissions of wrongdoing). See also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 768,
768-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (relating the objections by some class members to the settlement because it
contained "no admission of guilt, no assignment of blame" by the chemical companies and because the
government failed to participate and admit its role), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
64. See generally Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, andFairness, 54 OHIO ST.
LJ. 1, 16-20 (1993) (explaining that lawyers need to consider how different clients would value a
remedy and that valuation might differ across a class). See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1205 (1982) (discussing the complexity of
representing classes and the need for lawyers to attempt to communicate with groups of clients);
LawrenceM. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-CenteredDecisionmaking, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv. 709
(1989) (arguing that it is important for lawyers representing groups to rely on client-centered norms
and to make an affirmative effort to ascertain the views of class members).
65. See, e.g., KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE
BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD 156-245 (1976) (detailing trauma to individuals and to community resulting
in aftermath of flood); GILBERT, supra note 63, at 221 (describing Gilbert's interview and meetings
with her attorney whose voice was "crisp and perfunctory"); id. at 242-58 (reporting her discomfort
as a plaintiff at a deposition and her lawyer's unresponsive attitude); id. at 269-71 (describing the
crudeness of the discussion when settlement was proposed and the absence of explanation).
66. This term does not appear regularly in the literature but is one that was adopted in In re
Nineteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 605 (Ist
Cir. 1992). I was an appellate counsel in this case, representing IRPAs in a fee dispute.
67. In general, the literature on the effects of lawyers in such cases focuses on their role as
.agents" for clients, the limited means by which the client-principles can police their lawyers, and the
incentives of lawyers. Often ignored are other aspects of the attorney-client relationship and of the role
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Large-scale litigations are entities created or sanctioned by courts. As
judges and lawyers craft such amalgams, they should attend to the expe-
riences of litigants within them. Dr. Hensler assumes that it is desirable
to enable individual participation in litigation. 6a She relies on a good deal
of social science research finding that individuals distinguish process from
outcome.'e Individual litigants in ordinary tort litigation have reported
greater satisfaction with procedures such as court-annexed arbitration and
trials, about which litigants report that they can participate and have some
"control."' A good deal of the academic literature on the meaning of
due process contains a parallel theme: that process has a value not totally
dependent on outcomes, and that its purposes may include dignifying indi-
viduals, enabling participation, giving voice to litigants' views, and
effectuating outcomes. 1'
What import should both theories of the value of process and empir-
ical understandings of litigants' concerns have in large-scale litigation?
Should judges try to create incentives for an individual attorney-client
relationship to exist in the large-scale mass tort lawsuit? What roles could
and should IRPAs play in a consolidated mass tort? How high on a hier-
archy of aspirations should participation and control values be placed?
What is the relationship between the role of individual lawyers and
perceptions of litigants of their participation and control?
I raise these questions here not to answer them all but to point to the
necessity of their consideration.' Having process values does not equate
of litigation beyond its production of outcomes. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 877, 896-917 (1987) (discussing plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives to maximize fees); Macey &
Miller, supra note 11, at 17, 17-27 (considering the problem of "design[ing] incentive structures that
reduce the disparity of interest between" attorneys and clients).
68. See Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, supra note 1, at 1624 ("The challenge
then is to.. . enhance litigant control and participation .... ).
69. Id. at 1593-94; see also JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 6-16 (1975) (describing experimental studies on disputants' perceptions of
process and concluding that such perceptions are not dependent solely upon outcomes); E. Allan Lind
et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice
System, 24 LAw & Soc'Y Rv. 953, 953 (1990) ("[P]rocedural justice judgments and outcome
satisfaction [are] little related to objective outcome.").
70. Lind et al., supra note 69, at 982. Note the distinction between individual reports of control
and some objective measure of whether control exists. Id. at 983-86.
71. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CalculusforAdministrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153; 1. Roland Pennock, Introduction to DUE PROCESS xv, xvii
(J. Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds., 1977); Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day In Court"
Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 193, 279-89 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Rethinking
the Day in Court].
72. See Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate, supra note 61, for
elaboration of these issues.
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with having a lawyer or with thinking that lawyers provide good process.
Lawyers may be bad agents in terms of process values, just as they have
been accused of being inadequate representatives when the focus is on
outcomes;73 lawyers may be disloyal, self-serving, inept, or inattentive.74
Perhaps other people, such as lay advocates,' or litigants themselves,
should play greater roles in large-scale litigations. 6 and lawyers' roles
should be diminished.
Thus far, judges have ordered fee payments to PSC members, who
have highly visible roles in shaping litigation strategy.' Should judges
have interest in creating monetary incentives for IRPAs to do the unglam-
orous work of providing ordinary legal services to the group of claimants?
Can judges, clients, or others police the provision of services, so as to
require fee payments only when services are actually rendered? Should
courts focus instead on facilitating client-based groups?7" Or are the intra-
group conflicts among claimants and their physical dispersion obstacles too
73. Coffee, supra note 67, at 879, 882-96 (discussing the problems plaintiffs have in monitoring
their attorneys).
74. Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINOS LJ. 769, 778, 812,
811-28 (1992) (arguing for a change from the "victimization strategy of disability advocacy" which
.reproduces images of... dependence, incompetence, and deviance... [and] inhibits ... narratives
of [ I autonomy and community"); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE. LJ. 2107, 2131 (1991) (noting poverty lawyers' reliance on
their "own narratives to define the client's story ... silence[s] and displace[s] client narratives"); Lucie
E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly On the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 861
(1990) (commenting that advocacy disempowers clients because "advocacy is a practice of speaking for
[the client,] . . .[and] the advocate ... inevitably replays the drama of subordination").
75. See generally Edward V. Sparer, Howard Thorkelson, & Jonathan Weiss, The Lay Advocate,
43 U. DET. LJ. 493 (1966) (discussing the value of lay advocates).
76. KAREN M. HICKS, SURVIVING THE DALKON SHIELD IUD: WOMEN v. THE PHARMACEITICAL
INDUSTRY 2, 50-72, 118-19 (1994) (discussing the Dalkon Shield Information Network (DSIN), a
political organization of which Hicks was the "principal founder," which created "an empowering
dialogue with Dalkon Shield women" by cracking "the legalistic rhetoric").
77. See Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate, supra note 61, at 66; see
also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir.) (citing the "fiduciary duty"
of lead counsel not to "overreach" in a class fee application (quoting Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp.,
88 F.R.D. 11, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980))), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987). Some judges have raised
concerns about their obligations toward both litigants and the community as a whole. See JACK B.
WEINmN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 89-112 (1995) (discussing ethics of
courts).
78. At some points in the Dalkon Shield litigation, claimants' groups worked as consumer
networks and functioned to create counterweights to the lawyers. HICKS, supra note 76, at 57-72, 96-
107 (describing the development of the Dalkon Shield Information Network and its interaction with the
courts and attorneys involved in the litigation); see also Elizabeth Newman & Laura Fry, The Dalkon
Shield and Women's Litigation 14-33 (1990) (unpublished; on file with the Texas Law Review). In the
1960s, training lay advocates was the goal of some members of the welfare rights organizations.
MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973,
at 28 (1993); see also Sparer et al., supra note 75, at 494, 509-15 (describing the "necessary and
proper role of ... lay advocates in securing justice. . .).
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great to overcome?79 Should efforts be made to help networks of lawyers
who are not on the PSC to get together, so that they can form a group of
significant size, by which to form a counterweight to the power of a PSC
and of defendants' lawyers?' Or are these propositions misdirected,
because of the fear that enabling individuals or subgroups to exercise
control and to participate results in "degeneration" 8 that will undermine
aggregate solutions? To return to the game theory metaphors with which
I began, the fear (as Dr. Hensler notes) is too many "players" will attempt
to find places at the table, and with the jostling, the proposed "global
peace" settlement will unravel.
Deciding upon one's aspirations is critical; there is no escape from
making decisions about questions of participation, control, and individ-
ualization. Every time lawyers and judges craft or authorize various ADR
processes, fashion or approve resolutions, structure or avoid group trials,
propose and approve attorney fee awards, these questions are answered.
The structure of a lawsuit, its size, and the roles accorded to lawyers and
clients create incentives that enhance or diminish individual participation.
Money paid to lawyers is key: what forms of work are contemplated in the
ADR programs and what work is paid for by court-ordered awards or per-
mitted to be paid for under contractual agreements will greatly affect the
kind of legal services provided.
I hope that the "players" pay increased attention to the issues raised
by Deborah Hensler. Procedural innovations, rules, and agreements should
specify the respective roles of lawyers and clients and the roles of the
different lawyers-those on the inside, sitting at the table, and those who
79. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684, 685 (1941) (discussing potential claimants' lack of information
about their injuries, their legal rights, and resources to pursue redress); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Tort
Litigation: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming May 1995)
(manuscript at 36, on file with the Texas LawReview) (commenting on the "diffuseness and conflicting
interests of plaintiffs").
80. Cf. Schuck, supra note 79 (manuscript at 31-32) (noting that, in non-mandatory class actions,
opt-out rights of plaintiffs give them the ability to dissent from proposed settlements with which they
disagree).
81. Ben Kaplan first used this term in 1963, when he explained why mass torts were likely to be
unsuitable for class action treatment. As he put it, even if aggregated, many mass torts would
"degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried." Memorandum from Ben Kaplan,
Reporter, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, at EE-27
(Jan. 17, 1963) (summary statement for Topic EE, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions),
microformed on CIS No. CI-6313-087 (Congressional Info. Serv.). He thought that individual
questions of liability and of damages, coupled with varying state law on torts, would require a good
deal of individualized treatment. Id.; see Judith Resnik, From 'Cases' to "Litigation," 54 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5, 9-14 & n.17 (explaining Kaplan's objections to including mass
torts as examples of cases to fit within the class action rule that he, as one of the drafters of the Federal
Rules, was proposing); see also Bone, Rethinking the Day in Court, supra note 71, at 269-70, 279-89
(asserting that claims that litigants have rights to strategic autonomy are overstated).
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never appear in court. The rules created in response to today's novel
situations, arising in large-scale litigation, will spill over, affecting other
kinds of cases. Procedural rules, ethical rules, and fee award allocations
need to go hand in hand, and they should feature prominently in the
innovative procedures that the participants in this Symposium shape.
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